

THE IMAGE OF THE INVADERS IN THE POLITICAL SERMONS IN THE GREAT DUCHY OF WARSAW

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Abstract. The article, based on the analysis of preserved political sermons from the period of the Duchy of Warsaw, discusses the image of occupants that presented in the sermons. It unequivocally shows that the greatest enemy of Poland was thought to be Russia, especially after Napoleon's victory over Prussia in the war against the fourth coalition (1806–1807). Russia was presented as a barbaric country, driven by violence and distant from what can be generally termed as "European civilization". Obviously, in this context it was believed that Russia should be pushed away beyond the Dnieper or even the Volga River, as Jan Paweł Woronicz argued. It should be borne in mind that the contemporary preaching was a part of a more general political ideas based on deep distrust towards Russia, sometimes accompanied by undermining its status as an European state.

Key words: The Duchy of Warsaw, Polish preaching in the 19th century, partitions of Poland

The appearance of the Napoleon's troops in the Polish lands in November 1806 radically changed the situation on the territory 11 years after the third partition. The war waged by the French emperor against two occupant armies, the Prussian and the Russian, created an opportunity to introduce the Polish matters into international politics, especially the question of independence of the Polish Commonwealth or at least a part of its former territory. Napoleon was interested in the creation of Polish troops supporting the French army and the remains of Legions under the command of general Jan Henryk Dąbrowski. The campaign turned out to be impossible to complete in the autumn of 1806. The need for winter rest required the support of the local populace and called for the creation of local administration. Even though the emperor did not plan to make far-reaching commitments before the end of military activities, he did call for mobilization of Polish troops, securing food supply, lodgings, and field hospitals. The creation of the Governing Commission in January 1807 with the authority over the territory taken from the Prussians (called "Poland captured from the Prussian king") gave some hope for regaining independence.

On the other hand, the lack of confidence in the French army should be noted. The forces were perceived, as was Napoleon, in terms of the French Revolution that gave rise to it. Requisitions and robberies did not improve its image either¹. However, the actual defeat of Prussia after the great battles of Jena and Auerstädt, as well as the expected defeat of Russia, created an opportunity for regaining independence (with the help of Napoleon I, obviously). In this situation, Dąbrowski and Józef Wybicki wrote and sent out two proclamations. The first one from November 3, 1806, titled *Wezwanie do Powstania Narodowego*², was aimed at igniting an uprising army, which was to be transformed into Polish armed forces later on. It is very telling that the second proclamation, signed by the general himself, was addressed nearly a month later (December 4, 1806) almost exclusively to the Polish clergy³. *Odezwa do Duchowieństwa* was an appeal to the Catholic priests, urging them to officially support the national cause, to show its traditional patriotism, and to motivate citizens to take arms. However, for Dąbrowski and Wybicki it was particularly important that the Church supported the creation of Polish army. It seems that in this complex political situation Polish patriots believed that they do not have enough authority to complete the task. The help of the Church was instrumental in changing the perception of Napoleon, who was pictured as a liberator sent from heaven.

The proclamation alone could not influence individual priests, since acceptance on the church authorities was necessary. However, in December 8 the administer of Warsaw diocese, Adam Prażmowski, issued a special pastoral letter to his subordinates, and on December 28 the archbishop nominee in Gniezno, Ignacy Raczyński, did the same. The letters allowed priests to address political matters and the ongoing changes in the Polish lands. This created a framework for the Catholic church to support the fight for independence on the side of Napoleon, and later on, under the decree of *Tylża*, in the Duchy of Warsaw.

Church's agreement to support the struggle for independence led to numerous political sermons about the current situation, preached on any possible occasion, including consecration of military flags, oaths of newly formed military units, creation of Polish local authorities, and, for the first 15 years, May 3rd Constitution Day celebrations⁴. Obviously, the didactic role of these sermons was subjected to their propaganda function.

¹ Undoubtedly, the attempt at taking away the treasures of the Jasna Góra monastery was very unpopular among the Polish population. The treasure was saved thanks to a personal request from general Dąbrowski to Napoleon, but the distrust for the French remained, see: A. Achmatowicz, *Epizod napoleoński w dziejach Jasnej Góry*, "Studia Claromontana", vol. 8 (1987) p. 165–203.

² *Archiwum Wybickiego*, vol. II (1802–1822), ed. A.M. Skalkowski, Gdańsk 1950, p. 30–32.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 63–64.

⁴ E.M. Ziółek, *Religijny aspekt uroczystości patriotycznych u progu Księstwa Warszawskiego XI. 1806 – IV. 1807 (w świetle relacji prasy warszawskiej)*, "Roczniki Humanistyczne", vol. 55

It should also be noted that the texts of most of these sermons did not survive until present. Historians have access to the ones that were published in print or at least reported in the press of that period. Many of them were mentioned in newspapers as “lofty”, “patriotic”, etc., but the content was not quoted⁵.

The most interesting in terms of the subject are sermons preached during wars. This is understandable, because the preachers felt that they should inspire patriotism in the audience, encourage them to fight, and boost soldiers’ morale. Drawing attention to faults of the occupants served this purpose to some extent. The necessity of presenting the French emperor in a positive light, required depicting him in opposition to the enemies of the Polish Commonwealth. It is worth noting that the preachers usually gave more attention to the occupant states that were currently at war, which also the same time explained the reasons why the war was considered just⁶.

The presentation of Napoleon I as a savior of the Polish nation, compared to the biblical Cyrus, automatically showed his enemies, Prussia and Russia, as barbaric Babylonians, harassing the chosen nation⁷. On the other hand, depicting Napoleon as a tool in the hand of God, chosen to annihilate the Prussian and Russian armies, led to an almost apocalyptic vision of the struggle, and presented the occupants as a collective Antichrist⁸. This imagery appeared in virtually all sermons discussed here. Bearing in mind the general knowledge of the majority of audience, preachers typically referred to the history of Poland, especially the recent history, which was commonly known.

(2007) issue 2, pp. 9–22; *ibid.*, *Obchody święta Konstytucji 3 Maja w 1807 r.*, “Teki Komisji Historycznej Odz. Lubelski PAN”, vol. 4 (2007) pp. 26–37.

⁵ See “Gazeta Korrespondenta Warszawskiego i Zagranicznego” (GKWZ), “Gazeta Warszawska” (GW) from the years 1806–1812.

⁶ Obviously, this pertains to the wars with Prussia and Russia in 1806/07, with Austria in 1809 and with Russia in 1812.

⁷ This is an image painted by Jan Paweł Woronicz in the sermon on May 3, 1807, where he compared Napoleon to Cyrus, Alexander the Great, and Constantine, see: J. P. Woronicz, *Pisma wybrane*, (ed.) M. Nesteruk, Z. Rejman, Ossolineum 2002, p. 179, 183. It should be noted, however, that the line was rarely crossed when Bonaparte was compared directly to Christ, as in the sermon of Florian Onufry Jelski during the official arrival of Napoleon to Warsaw in 1806. Jelski said: “A Heavenly messenger has arrived to the Polish land, Great, invincible, and the most powerful Emperor of the French NAPOLEON with victorious army of his, in order to vivify the Polish Nation, in which he resembles Christ the God, who once came to Earth to redeem mankind” (GKWZ, no. 104 (30 XII 1806 r.)). Instead, he was presented as a “divine intervention,” the “hand of God,” trying not to commit, at the same time, an act of sacrilege. More on the image of Napoleon in Polish sermons in J. Matuszczak, *Cyrus czy Nabuchodonozor? Biblijne konteksty obrazu Napoleona w polskim kaznodziejstwie XIX wieku*, “Nasza Przeszłość”, vol. 97 (1992) pp. 167–190.

⁸ Only once was Napoleon compared to Moses, and the victory over Prussia to the exit of the chosen (Polish) people from the Egyptian slavery, *Kazanie na podziękowanie Bogu miane przy poświęceniu Orła Białego w kościele OO. Reformatorów przez X. Chryzostoma Chorzelińskiego reformata, kaznodzieję miejscowego dnia 14 czerwca 1807 r.* Warszawa 1807, pp. 4–5

This convention was born in the already mentioned pastoral letter by A. Prażmowski⁹. The tendency will resurface in subsequent speeches of preachers and consists in emphasizing the unequivocally malevolent role of Russia. The author of the letter did not mention that it was the Prussian monarch Frederick II who initiated the partition of Poland. Instead, he emphasized that Russia had sought to rule over the whole of Poland, and that the empress Catherine II purposefully humiliated the last king of Poland, Stanisław August, who spent the last days of his life in Petersburg. This humiliation was even more painful, because, as Prażmowski reminded, 200 years earlier a Polish hetman captured Moscow and resided in Kremlin.

In the sermons aimed at soldiers, the main motif was of course the victories of the Polish Commonwealth, especially over Russia and broadly understood Germans¹⁰, sometimes Jan III Sobieski's Vienna expedition was mentioned, but only to indicate the treason on the part of Austria. In general, Austria disappears from sermons in the years 1806–07, which should be interpreted in political terms. The war with the fourth coalition was not waged against Austria, and the emperor Francis, was neutral in the conflict, at least officially. Four sermons from this period which are particularly worth attention are: the sermon of Wincenty Frydrych from January 1, 1807¹¹, two sermons of Ignacy Przybylski from February 4 and May 3, 1807¹², and the sermon of Wojciech Szweykowski from Płock cathedral, celebrating the oath of general S. Woyczyński's soldiers¹³. All of them reminded Polish victories "of Tannenberg, over Moscow, of Vienna" – that is Grunwald, the Moscow expeditions of 1612, and, of course, the battle of Vienna¹⁴. Frydrych reached to an even more remote history and talked about Bolesław Chrobry's victory over the emperor Henry II¹⁵. This was meant to show to the audience that their current enemies are the ones that their ancestors successfully fought against. It is particularly noteworthy that the enemies were constantly referred to as Moskals and Brandenburgians. In his February sermon, Przybylski seems to conflate Brandenburgians with the Teutonic Order¹⁶. This was done purposefully by almost all preachers. It resulted in identification of one of the occupants: the Kingdom of Prussia with the Margraviate of Brandenburg,

⁹ Archdiocese Archive in Warsaw, sig. 880, k. 6 (leaflet)

¹⁰ Here, the term "Germans" indicated a geographical area or a cultural community of the invaders, and had no strictly political reference.

¹¹ Delivered during an official mass accompanying the oath of newly organized units of the Polish army, GKWZ no. 3 (9 I 1807) appendix.

¹² The first one delivered during the oath of the 2. battalion 1. regiment of infantry and consecration of flags, the second during the siege of Kołobrzeg, to commemorate May 3rd Constitution Day, GKWZ no. 14 (17 II 1807); *ibid.*, no. 42 (26 V 1807)

¹³ GKWZ, no. 26 (31 III 1807) appendix.

¹⁴ GKWZ no. 14 (17 II 1807)

¹⁵ GKWZ no. 3 (9 I 1807) appendix.

¹⁶ GKWZ no. 14 (17 II 1807)

from which Prussia originated, but also it had the most negative associations in the historical memory of Poles. Przybylski emphasized:

[...] we enter the countries where our ancestors fought with the **cunning Teutons**, and which the **Brandenburgian traitor** [my emphasis – E.M.Z.] ripped out from our lap. Every inch of land in Polish Prussia is imbued with enemy's blood due to the courage and valor of Poles¹⁷.

In the light of these words, it is apparent that the change of enemy's name had an additional function: it emphasized that historically Prussia belonged to Poland, and that the name was derived from the tribe of Prussians, who were neither Germans, nor Brandenburgians. This was yet another reason why the latter nations should be seen as invaders. The emphasis on clear separation of these notions was, of course, a propaganda trick. Only in the sermon from May 3 Przybylski reminds that Poles were also responsible for the downfall of their country in the 18th century, mainly due to nobility's anarchistic attitudes and the lack of alertness¹⁸. Nonetheless, the main message was that the fall of the Polish Commonwealth is to be blamed on the "perennial" enemies, like Germans and Brandenburgians.

While the three above sermons seem to be a little schematic, despite the fact that they do contain a deeper reflection, the sermon of Szweykowski is very different in nature, and is an example of classical rhetorics¹⁹. The preacher emphasized that it had a didactic aim, because he intended to educate the audience about their obligations towards the Fatherland. Szweykowski blamed the responsibility for the partitions entirely on the occupants and he accused them of envy about the fact that Poland was the bulwark of Europe. He highlighted that Prussia built its power exclusively at the territorial and the political expense of Poland. The partition by Austria was interpreted as an act of treason against the country which once had saved the empire from a Turkish invasion. Nonetheless, according to Szweykowski the most dangerous opponent was Russia. This claim was supported by the conviction this country could be beaten by the Polish army in an open battle, but Russia was involved in a diplomatic game, which was a deadly threat for every normal country. The most dangerous weapon in this game was hypocrisy and weakening of opponent's alertness, so that eventually it could be attacked and destroyed²⁰. Reminding the massacre of Prague in 1794, he urged the Polish soldiers to avenge the crime, emphasizing that this kind of warfare is typical of Russia: it is aimed at destruction and intimidation of the enemy.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ GKWZ no. 42 (26 V 1807)

¹⁹ The author was one of the most prominent figures of his times, the future rector of the University of Warsaw, *Źródła do dziejów wychowania i szkolnictwa w Polsce doby Izby Edukacyjnej Publicznej 1807–1812*, pub. Z. Kukulski, Lublin 1931, pp. XXVI–XXVIII.

²⁰ GKWZ, no. 26 (31 III 1807) appendix.

It seems that the sermons which are the most interesting in terms of erudition and reflections on the part the author were delivered by Woronicz on May 3, 1807 during the consecration of eagles and on June 26, 1812 during the opening of the extraordinary parliament session after the outbreak of the war with Russia. In principle, despite the fact that they were written in different periods and related to different political events, they can be discussed together, if only due to the fact that the author saw Russia as the greatest enemy of Poland²¹.

In the first sermon mentions the great kings of Poland, but do not pay too much attention to Austria and Prussia. It is hard to say if this is only due to the fact that in May 1807 the Prussian army was already defeated, but the struggle with Russian troops continued. Perhaps the author wanted to convince the audience gathered on May 3rd Constitution Day that it was necessary to completely defeat the "Eastern tsardom"²², as he called Russia? The sermon can be treated as a political and historical treatise, where Woronicz pictured Poland as the bulwark of Europe and Christianity against both the incursions of Turks and Russia. According to him, the main cause of the Polish Commonwealth's downfall was the treason of its neighbors²³. For this reason, he called for continuing the war with Russia until complete defeat of the enemy and for extending the borders of the future Polish state from the river Saale to the Dnieper²⁴. Moreover, he urged prince Józef Poniatowski, the commander-in-chief of the Polish army, to organize an expedition to the source of the Volga²⁵. According to the preacher, this was necessary to avenge the death of banished king Stanisław August, which dishonored the whole state²⁶.

Woronicz's sermon on the opening of the extraordinary parliament session in 1812 was even more anti-Russian, which seems understandable in the current political situation. The speaker considered the Russian aggression as totally ungrounded and resulting from vanity. He reminded that the Duchy of Moscow could be born as a political entity only after the great Lithuanian prince Witold had recaptured some of the Ruthenian lands from Tartars. Only then did Mos-

²¹ J.P. Woronicz, op. cit. pp. 175–197, 198–215.

²² The celebrations were attended not only by the Governing Commission and the people of Warsaw, but also representatives of France, including the minister of foreign affairs, Charles de Talleyrand, French officers, E.M. Ziółek, *Obchody...* pp. 33–36. The celebrations combined May 3rd Constitution Day, consecration of the flags of the Polish army and eagles hung later on the Town Hall, as well as military oath. For this reason, the preacher could not be a just any priest, so J.P. Woronicz, the canon of Warsaw, was chosen.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

²⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 186–187, 194. The author staked the borders of Poland which never existed in the proposed form throughout history. They were meant to include the German territory captured by Bolesław Chrobry, and the furthest eastward extent.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

²⁶ The idea of border from Elbe (the Saale is its tributary) to the Dnieper was popular, since on June 14 it was repeated by Chorzeński in his sermon, *Kazanie na podziękowanie...*, p. 9.

cow become a part of Europe²⁷. Nonetheless, in its essence, Russia remained an Asian dictatorship, waging wars against Poland and violating other nation's right to independence by, among other things, trying to have a say in the domestic affairs of Poland, influencing parliamentary sessions, and even abducting Polish citizens and imprisoning them in "prison towers of Siberia"²⁸. The Asian despotism if Russia was manifested, according to Woronicz, especially in the barbaric cruelty, for instance against the Bar confederates, or during the massacre of Prague in 1794. This was compared to the cruelty of Tamerlan. Thus, he saw Russia as a criminal state devoid of European civility and an insatiable pillager. For the preacher, the worst of the crimes was abolishing by military force the reforms of the Polish state started during the Great Parliament. This event, plotted by a group of traitors supported by the troops of Catherine II, was compared to the crime of Cain²⁹. The conclusion of this and earlier sermons was the conviction that if Russia is a barbaric and ruffianly state, compared to Antichrist, and an obvious mission of given by Providence to Napoleon Bonaparte was avenging the crimes.

Jan Klemens Gołaszewski, the bishop of Wigry, preached on the same note in his parliament speech on June 26, 1812³⁰. It was not a sermon, but a senator's speech³¹, kept in a tone as emotional as most of parliament speeches. It was widely believed that defeating Russia is a matter of time and the rebirth of the Polish state will follow. Thus, bishop Gołaszewski emphasized the barbarity, but also "the contempt of the foreign people", which referred to the behavior of Russian ambassadors on king Stanisław August's court. Nonetheless, he also mentioned that the rulers of Russia dared to subjugate the Catholicism under the tsar's rule, which was unacceptable from the point of view of the Church³².

This was not an isolated opinion, and it was repeated by bishops in following pastoral letters. They were convinced that the war of 1812 was simply an act of justice. Even if they did not directly criticize the Russian occupant, due the fact

²⁷ Ibid., p. 203.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 205–206. This is a clear allusion to abduction of the senators and bishops Kajetan Sołtyk, Józef Załuski, and Waław and Seweryn Rzewuski to Kaluga, as well as constant intrusions into Polish domestic affairs on the part of the Russian ambassador during the rule of Stanisław August.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 209.

³⁰ *Diariusze sejmów Księstwa Warszawskiego* (issue 3) *Diariusz sejmowy z roku 1812*, pub. M. Kallas, "Teki Archiwalne", vol. 21 (1989), pp.132–134.

³¹ In the Duchy of Warsaw, just like in the pre-partition Poland, bishops ordinaries were senators, too.

³² The bishop of Wigry is rather vague in this case and mentions no names, but undoubtedly he meant the reorganization of the Church under the rule of Catherine II and Paul I carried out without consulting the Pope and lawless appointment of the archbishop of Mogilev Bohusz-Sięstrzeńcewicz, against Rome, see: B. Kumor, *Ustrój Kościoła katolickiego w zaborze rosyjskim (1772–1815)*, in: *Historia Kościoła w Polsce*, ed. B. Kumor, Z. Obertyński, Poznań – Warszawa 1979, vol. II, part 1, pp. 212–218.

that they presented the Moscow expedition as an act of historical justice, it can be assumed that their opinions about Russia were the same as Gołaszewski's³³. This attitude of the Church authorities made the clergy feel that they were allowed and encouraged to present their sentiments towards the occupant. This was apparent in many speeches of this period, as press reports suggest. It can be observed in the speech delivered on August 12, 1812 by the protonotary apostolic of St. Mary's Basilica in Cracow Wincenty Łańcucki during a session of the 5th department of the city of Cracow. Going back to the events of the extraordinary parliament session in June 1812, the preacher noted that Napoleon was "the scourge of God" dispensing justice to Russia, because it was a ruffianly state responsible to numerous treasons, pillaging and barbarity³⁴.

In the light of the texts presented, it is striking that very little was told about the third occupant. Austria was mentioned by the preachers in 1807 along with the two other countries, but even then they tried to focus on the crimes of Prussia and Russia. Actually, the only accusation against Austria was that the empire had been saved from the Turkish invasion by Jan III Sobieski and 100 years later it took part in the partition of Poland. This act was interpreted as treason³⁵. As already mentioned, this was understandable during the war with Prussia and Russia, but the lack of strong criticism of in 1809 was peculiar. At that time, Austria was an aggressor, the Polish and the Austrian armies fought in Galicia, and a Polish national uprising broke out. Poles were not of a better opinion about the Austrian occupation compared to those of other countries. At that time, it seems that the Prussian and even the Russian rule (since Alexander I), was more lenient than the Austrian. Many factors came into play: the case of Lviv Centralization, Dąbrowski's Legions fighting in Italy against Austria, and a number of external factors. However, the critique of the Austrian occupant is absent from the sermons of 1809. On July 4, 1809 the parson of Magnuszew Justyn Skrzyński delivered a sermon during the official welcoming of prince Józef's army³⁶. He addressed the commander-in-chief and his generals, he welcomed them as national heroes, comparing them to the historical kings of Poland: Bolesław Chrobry, the Jagiellonian dynasty, and Jan III Sobieski. They brought

³³ See the letter of the bishop of Chełm, F. Ciechanowski, KUL University Library, ms 2921, k.8; two letters of the bishop of Lublin W. Skarszewski, Archdiocese Archive in Lublin, Rep. 60 A 171, pp. 765–767, 767–769; the latter of the nominee of the bishop of Płock T. Ostaszewski, Archive of the Warsaw Province of Order of Friarscuria Minor Capuchin in Zakroczym, Archive of the Łomża Cloister, sig. 2-II-1, vol. II, b. 24; the letter of the bishop of Kielce W. Górski, "Dziennik Konfederacji Jeneralnej Królestwa Polskiego Roku 1812", no. 13 (2. VIII); Archive of Cracow Metropolitan Curia, *List pasterski biskupa Gawrońskiego z 1812 r.*; the letter of the bishop of Chełmno F. K. Rydzyński, A. Mańkowski, *Biskupa Rydzyńskiego i kapituły chełmińskiej akces do konfederacji generalnej Królestwa Polskiego 1812 r.*, "Zapiski Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu", vol. 7 (4th quarter of 1928) no. 12, pp. 334–335.

³⁴ "Dziennik Konfederacji..." no. 32 (23 IX 1812).

³⁵ Cf.: Szweykowski, Woronicz.

³⁶ GKWZ, no. 55 (11 VII 1809).

freedom to oppressed Galicia, but the preacher did not speak about any oppression in particular³⁷.

Skrzyński's sermon is known from a press report, so it can be assumed that the newspaper printed only the passages that the editors considered important. However the sermon of Mateusz Wojakowski delivered in liberated Lublin, published in whole by the author, has a similar structure³⁸. It should be borne in mind that Wojakowski was not an ordinary parson, but a figure known in the entire diocese. In the Kingdom of Poland, he would become the bishop suffragan of Lublin, engaged in the patriotic activity during the November Uprising³⁹. The entire sermon was a thanksgiving to God for regaining independence at that time, just like in the past⁴⁰. The sermon also praised a part of the Polish army and, obviously, Napoleon chosen by God to vanquish Poland's oppressors. However, the occupant itself was not mentioned or judged.

It seems that suffices to say that Austria, as opposed to the two other countries, was a Catholic state, and thus the clergy criticized it less severely. However, it appears that the shared faith was not a decisive factor. It is worth noting that Prussia was criticized more because of the fact that it was a successor of the Margraviate of Brandenburg. It seemed obvious that it also inherits the possessiveness of the medieval state and its political aims: the conquest of the territory east from the Margraviate. The same role was ascribed to the Teutonic Order. This was historically justified, because the 18th century Prussia was born from these two medieval states. Nonetheless, after the treaty of Tylża and the end of war, Prussia was no longer seen as a threat. On the other hand, during the war of 1807, it was emphasized that Prussia is an enemy of Poland "since always" and the conviction about their possessiveness and "Drang nach Osten" policy was used as an argument that Poland had to defend itself against the Western neighbor. However, no one mentioned that it was the Prussian king Frederick the Great who initiated the first partition and his successor Frederick William II continued this policy.

The analysis of the content of the preserved sermons shows that for the clergy of that time the most prominent enemy of the Polish Commonwealth was Russia. This followed from both the historical analysis and more recent events.

³⁷ Which is not to say that they did not exist. In the books of his parish Skrzyński meticulously noted the losses suffered by the parish due to Austria's preparation to the war with the Duchy in the spring of 1809. J. Wiśniewski, *Dekanat kozienicki*, Radom 1913 p. 90.

³⁸ *Kazanie w czasie powstania obudwoch (!) Gallicy w dzień uroczystości świętego Antoniego miane przez Jmć Xiędza Mateusza Wojakowskiego proboszcza garbowskiiego w kościele XX. Bernardynów w Lublinie roku 1809*, Warszawa 1809.

³⁹ I. Sadurski, *Biskup sufragan lubelski Mateusz Maurycy Wojakowski wobec powstania listopadowego*, w: *Powstanie listopadowe na Lubelszczyźnie. Wydarzenia – Ludzie – Źródła*, ed. A. Barańska, J. Skarbek, Lublin – Oświęcim 2013, pp. 54–76.

⁴⁰ Here, similarly to the preachers from 1807, the author compares the occupation to the Swedish Deluge, *Kazanie w czasie powstania...* pp. 11–13.

It was Russia that intended to occupy the entire territory of Poland. But what was much more important was the motives and the means of reaching the goals. All preachers were of the same opinion: Russia was not a civilized country, and it was impossible to negotiate with it according to the diplomatic rules obeyed by the rest of Europe. Also, Russia was not a country waging war in the manner accepted by civilized countries. The image of Russia shown in the sermons is the image of a barbaric state, which exists only due to conquests, whose rulers are able to break all political treaties, and whose armies commit the most atrocious crimes. Of course, this image reflects the experience of Poles from the period of the Bar confederacy, and especially from the Kościuszko Uprising and the already mentioned massacre of Prague in 1794⁴¹. Why was Russia the most dangerous? J. P. Woronicz answered in the sermon of May 3, 1807 that the centuries of Mongol slavery made Russia more Asian than European. Of course the Asian barbarity was a characteristic pertaining to Huns and other invaders remembered for their atrocities. For this reason, Woronicz believed that Russia is a mortal threat to Poland and Europe, and it should be pushed away as far as possible from the civilized world, ideally beyond the Don and the Volga⁴².

It should be highlighted that neither Woronicz, nor other preachers laid foundations of Polish policy towards Russia. Instead, they communicated to the common people what the main premise of the contemporary Polish policy was, or more generally, the beliefs held by Polish elites. Between 1806 and 1807 Józef Wybicki outlined the geographical features of the Polish lands that were to be used by Napoleon during the war Prussia and Russia. The text emphasized that it was crucial to extend the Polish Commonwealth's borders towards the Dnieper River, which was a large natural barrier. He argued that this was necessary because Russia, due to its political goals and the means to achieving them, was a constant threat, and it should be permanently pacified⁴³. The hostile attitude of Russia towards Poland and the necessity of the restoration of a strong Polish state in the war with Russia was also noted by French diplomats in 1808. They even claimed that strong Poland would be able to shield Europe against Russian aggression⁴⁴. The claims of the French politicians followed from the observations during the war of 1807, witnessing Russian activities, and later analysis of Polish experiences. This was true not only for the French. Prussian

⁴¹ The memories were vivid; after all it was not common in the contemporary Europe to slaughter ca. 20 000 of civilian inhabitants of a capture city, irrespective of sex and age. The memory of the victims was celebrated in the period of the Duchy of Warsaw. For example on November 4, 1809 the bishop of Cracow Andrzej Gawroński conducted a mourning mass in the Cracow cathedral, in the presence of the chapter and the Polish army, GKWZ no. 91 (14.XI.1809), "Gazeta Krakowska" no. 90 (8.XI.1809) appendix.

⁴² J.P. Woronicz, op. cit. pp. 196, 203.

⁴³ *Archiwum Wybickiego...*, pp. 84–85.

⁴⁴ Cf.: *Listy Dominika Kuczyńskiego do barona Goswina de Strassarta z lat 1807–1809*, pub. W. Zajewski, B. Cygler, Gdańsk 2002, pp. 165, 169, 185.

officers, for whom the Russian army was an ally in 1807, were horrified by the exploits of the allied army on the formally Prussian territory. The Prussian officers noted that the Russians used the scorched earth strategy against the French, so they robbed everything they could and destroyed the rest. Also, they kidnapped young males, so the villages between the Narew and the Bug Rivers were devastated and empty⁴⁵.

In this context, it should not come as a surprise that the Russian occupant was considered to be the most dangerous. The preachers intended to convey the message that even though Prussia and Austria were enemies, they were civilized enemies. Russia represented the barbaric lack of any rules and norms of culture, and therefore it was pictured as an almost apocalyptic threat. Of course, this image was perfectly compatible with Napoleon Bonaparte's legend: he was "the hand of Providence" and the avenger sent by heaven.

WIZERUNEK ZABORCÓW W KAZANIACH POLITYCZNYCH W OKRESIE KSIĘSTWA WARSZAWSKIEGO

Streszczenie. Artykuł, oparty na analizie zachowanych kazań politycznych z okresu Księstwa Warszawskiego, przedstawia obraz zaborców, jaki został w nich zawarty. Wynika z niego jednoznacznie, że – szczególnie od momentu pokonania przez Napoleona I Prus w wojnie z czwartą koalicją (1806–1807) – za największego wroga Polski uznawano Rosję. Była ona przedstawiana jako kraj barbarzyński, kierujący się w swoich działaniach przemocą i generalnie odległy od wszystkiego, co można objąć pojęciem „cywilizacji europejskiej”. Jako oczywiste zatem pojawiało się przekonanie o konieczności odrzucenia Rosji poza granice Dniepru, a nawet Wołgi. Takie przekonanie wyraził np. ks. Jan Paweł Woronicz. Należy więc zauważyć, że ówczesne kaznodziejstwo wpisywało się w ogólną koncepcję polityczną wyrażającą głęboką nieufność wobec Rosji, niekiedy negującą europejskość tego państwa.

Słowa kluczowe: Księstwo Warszawskie, kaznodziejstwo polskie w XIX w., zabory Polski

Translated from the Polish by Hubert Kowalewski

⁴⁵ M. Handelsman, *Pomiędzy Prusami a Rosją. Studia historyczne*, series III, Warszawa 1922, pp. 9–10.